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C apter 3 
by Joel B. Eisen 
I. Introduction 
This chapter examines how the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses alternative dispute resolution (ADR) meth-
ods to help resolve complex environmental disputes. In recent years, 
the EPA's use of ADR has increased dramatically in a wide variety 
of settings. 1 The EPA has made ADR a central feature of its envi-
ronmental enforcement strategy, encouraged its use in Title VI and 
environmental justice conflict settings, and turned to negotiated 
rulemaking as an alternative to the cumbersome notice-and-com-
ment process for the development of new federal regulations.2 Other 
EPA programs, such as the Brownfields Economic Redevelopment 
Initiative, promote nonadversarial methods for tackling complex 
environmental problems.3 This chapter focuses on environmental 
enforcement actions, where the EPA has made considerable 
progress toward a goal of making ADR a regular part of its enforce-
ment strategy. 
It is the EPA's official policy to consider ADR whenever it may 
result in a quicker, more efficient resolution of an enforcement 
action. The EPA has used ADR in civil enforcement actions initiat-
ed under seven major federal environmental statutes: the Clean Air 
Act (CAA); the Clean Water Act (CWA); the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA, popularly known as Superfund); the Emergency Planning & 
Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA); the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA); the Resource 
Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA); and the Toxic Substances 
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Control Act (TSCA).4 While the EPA has utilized several types of 
including convening, minitrials, and mediation, it most 
employs mediation for resolution of enforcement cases. Mediation 
proceedings have varied widely in their scope and complexity; the 
EPA has used mediation in cases with as few as two parties and as 
many as 1,200 participants. 
This chapter begins with a brief introduction to environmental 
ADR, including a description of the major ADR mechanisms, 
advantages disadvantages of using ADR to resolve environmen-
tal disputes, and the history of ADR's use in environmental disputes. 
It continues with an explanation of the growth of environmental 
enforcement ADR, including a summary of the statutes and policies 
encouraging the EPA to use ADR. Next it examines specific uses of 
ADR in enforcement cases, concentrating on the role of mediation 
in resolving CERCLA disputes. The chapter closes with a section 
that will be of particular interest to counsel for litigants in environ-
mental cases: anADR "road map" that summarizes the process from 
start to from the EPA's decision to use ADR, to selection 
an appropriate third-party neutral, to resolution of the dispute. 
The types of ADR in environmental disputes include any tech-
niques that parties employ to attempt to resolve their disputes vol-
untarily through the involvement of third-party neutrals. These 
include the following forms as well as lesser-known forms vari-
ations and hybrids (for example, med-arb ): 
Mediation, which is the dominant ADR method used in environ-
mental enforcement disputes, involves a neutral third party (the 
mediator) who helps the parties reach an agreement to resolve 
their dispute, whether or not they in fact do so. Usually the parties 
voluntarily enter into mediation and choose the mediator. The 
Environmental ADR 
mediator ordinarily does not have the power to render a binding 
decision, but instead assists the parties to resolve the dispute 
through a process of building consensus among them. 
• Arbitration is a more formal decision-making process involving a 
neutral third party (the arbitrator) that differs from mediation in 
that the parties select the arbitrator with the understanding that he 
or she will render a decision regarding the dispute; the decision 
may be binding or nonbinding. 5 
• Convening is a screening process that involves a neutral third 
party who brings the parties together at an early stage to help them 
determine whether they are willing to participate in ADR and 
decide what ADR process is appropriate. 
• Minitrials, which combine features of mediation and arbitration, 
involve the participants in presenting their positions in an abbrevi-
ated fashion to a panel that usually includes principals for each side 
who have authority to reach a settlement. Following the lawyers' 
presentations, the panel attempts to settle the dispute. A neutral 
third-party adviser usually presides over the proceeding. The 
adviser's involvement may take many fom1s: for example, com-
menting on arguments or evidence at the hearing; evaluating the 
case and rendering a nonbinding advisory opinion regarding the 
outcome of the dispute if it were litigated; and serving as a media-
tor if the principals cannot reach a settlement after the hearing. 
• Fact-finding involves a neutral third party (who usually possesses 
specific scientific or technical expertise) who does not resolve the 
entire dispute, but instead makes detailed findings regarding 
complex facts that can often narrow the issues in dispute. 
Proponents of using ADR in environmental disputes cite many 
advantages. Environmental disputes are often complex cases involv-
ing multiple parties, complicated statutes and regulations, and reams 
of scientific and technical evidence. The dispute over remediation of 
an individual site being cleaned up under CERCLA, for example, 
~an feature hundreds of parties facing liability for the costs of clean-
Ing up a site contaminated with hazardous wastes. The typical envi-
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ronmental dispute is dynamic, as new issues tend to arise through-
out the life of the dispute and the cast of parties changes continual-
ly. With the average environmental enforcement lawsuit taking years 
to complete, ADR may offer a quicker resolution of the dispute. 
Participants may save lawyers' and consultants' fees they would 
incur in protracted litigation; governmental attorneys can use ADR 
to obtain quicker resolution of cases and spare limited agency 
resources for other pressing matters. 6 
Other claimed advantages include empowering participants to 
choose the most constructive way to resolve their dispute. This flex-
ibility is inherent in some forms of ADR, particularly mediation, 
because the participants themselves decide what the process will be 
and what settlement the dispute will be most appropriate. Given 
flexibility, ADR can allow to structure settlements 
that go beyond mere recovery of costs or imposition of monetary 
and maximize opportunities for improvements to environ-
mental quality creative projects undertaken as part of set-
tlements. ADR usually is a less adversarial process of litigation, 
which may help preserve relationships parties that 
might be destroyed or at least severely damaged in court. 
can develop a basis for the parties' in the espe-
cially if they must deal with each other. This is often the case in 
environmental disputes, for one party is remediating a 
site contaminated by a number of others, or the parties are entities 
desire to have continuing good relations (for example, govern-
mental enforcement agencies and units of federal, state, and local 
governments). ADR also may be useful in cases where the govern-
agency and the litigants have developed distrust for each 
other. A third-party neutral can rebuild lines of communication, 
restore trust that has eroded, and help the parties reach a settlement. 
These and other advantages lead many to conclude that ADR 
should be used more extensively in environmental disputes. 7 Yet 
environmental ADR has engendered controversy from the very 
beginning, and there has been considerable debate about its utility. 
Some believe ADR is never appropriate in environmental disputes 
Statutes and Policies Promoting Environmental Enforcement ADR 
because they involve public issues, "such as conflicting positions 
about how natural resources should be used," that must be aired in 
court.8 Others claim environmental ADR is useful only in limited 
circumstances. One early commentator stated that only 10 percent 
of all environmental disputes are suitable for ADR because disputes 
that involve numerous parties, ideologically charged issues which 
provoke sharp disagreements, or serious uncertainties about pre-
dicting the long-term efficacy of settlements (such as problems 
inherent in assessing the effectiveness of a cleanup remedy) should 
be excluded. 9 Moreover, ADR is not always successful. Mediation 
does not bind those who do not participate, so it always "carries the 
risk that disgruntled parties will refuse to enter into a settlement."10 
Despite these concerns, environmental ADR has flourished at 
the EPA. Nmnerosity of parties alone does not preclude the EPA 
from using ADR; as noted above, successful environmental 
enforcement mediations have included up to 1,200 participants. 
However, the EPA uses several criteria to screen cases to ensure that 
mediation is not used inappropriately. for example, "precedent-
setting issues" are involved in a case, it will not use mediation. 11 
The history of environmental ADR is brief, as the first envi-
ronmental mediation efforts took place in the early to mid-1970s 
with support from groups such as the Ford Foundation. The early 
growth of environmental ADR was not rapid. In 1985, Judge Patricia 
Wald concluded that ADR in environmental disputes was a "promis-
ing infant with unknown potential and a short track record." 12 
The period since then has seen an explosive growth in the use 
of ADR in environmental disputes, particularly in enforcement cases. 
The EPA and the Department of Justice have identified several hun-
dred enforcement cases in which an ADR process has been complet-
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ed or is ongoing.13 This number is expanding rapidly in recent years 
as the use of ADR in enforcement cases has been encouraged and 
promoted by amendments to federal environmental statutes, special-
ized federal statutes on ADR, and governmental policy. 
The~/~ ___ _ 
A fundamental building block in the process of establishing 
wider acceptance of environmental mediation was the EPA's 1987 
Final Guidance Memo onADR. 14 In this memo, the agency declared 
that its policy was "to utilize ADR in the resolution of appropriate 
civil enforcement cases." The memo described the various ADR 
techniques, the process the EPA would use in selecting cases for 
ADR, the basic qualifications for mediators and other third-party 
neutrals, and the case management procedures for cases submitted 
toADR. 
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Acts of 1990 and 1996, 
the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, and the Civil Justice 
Reform Act authorized and promoted federal agencies' use 
of ADR. 15 The 1990 ADR Act validated the use of ADR by federal 
agencies and departments and established guidelines for 
eligible cases procedures. It did not choose one technique for 
general use or even require it; the Act states agencies' use of 
ADR is voluntary. However, the 1990 ADR Act encouraged each 
federal agency department- including the EPA- to use 
techniques, including mediation, conciliation, and arbitration as an 
alternative to commencing litigation and as a means of resolving 
disputes. The 1996 ADR Act permanently authorized the 1990 Act 
and expanded it (for example, by authorizing federal agencies to 
conduct binding arbitration). The CJRA required each federal dis-
trict court to create a "civil justice expense and delay reduction 
plan," established a federal policy favoring the use of ADR, and ere-
Statutes and Policies Promoting Environmental Enforcement ADR 
ADR programs in federal courts. This 
the use of ADR in federal courts, and the vast federal 
courts currently authorize to use ADR. The 1998 
ADR Act directed each court to 
cases consider the use of ADR "at an ,,.,,,.,,...,,,..,,.., 
IIU>!Q)LHIOI." and to 
for use by the parties."16 
Under an executive order 
Resolution 
heads of cabinet departments and aJ".,•HvAvO> 
interests, to serve as a committee to facilitate and encourage agency 
use of ADR.20 The 1998 statute creating the U.S. Institute for 
Environmental Conflict Resolution under the 
Udall Foundation independent agency the 
branch) is further evidence the pervasiveness of ADR in the fed-
eral government.21 
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The EPA's senior counsel for ADR, based in the Office of the 
Administrator, is designated as the EPA's dispute resolution special-
ist under the 1998 ADRAct. The senior counsel for ADR is respon-
sible for setting agencywide ADR policy and overseeing program 
development. There are two main ADR contact points in EPA pro-
gram offices: (1) the Consensus and Dispute Resolution Program 
(CDRP), based in the Office of Policy; and (2) the Enforcement 
ADR Program. This section describes the second of these, with 
some reference to the CDRP when appropriate. 
The EPA's Enforcement ADR Program is headed by the EPA's 
ADR liaison and is based in the Office of Enforcement and 
Compliance Assurance (OECA). The ADR liaison and two trained 
specialists based in OECA's Office of Site Remediation (primarily 
responsible for RCRA and CERCLA enforcement) provide support 
for the use of ADR in enforcement cases. This support includes con-
ducting training programs on ADR, providing technical assistance 
on ADR implementation issues, identifying qualified third-party 
neutrals (and serving as neutrals in some instances), helping 
regional offices contract for ADR services, promoting the use of 
ADR within OECA, writing policies and articles relating to ADR, 
and publishing an ADR status report. ADR specialists in the 
regional offices consult on the use of ADR in enforcement cases and 
serve as neutrals in specific cases.22 
ADR has been successfully used to resolve a number of 
enforcement cases. A small sample of cases will serve to illustrate 
the wide variety of uses of enforcement ADR: 
• In 1998, convening, neutral evaluation, and mediation of a multi-
media penalty case against Pfizer, Inc. based upon regulatory vio-
lations ofRCRA, CWA, and EPCRTKA avoided litigation and led 
to a settlement embodied in a consent decree under which Pfizer 
agreed to pay a penalty of $625,000 and undertake two supple-
mental projects valued at approximately $1 7 5, 000. 
• A 1996 mediation proceeding of a dispute under RCRA involving 
NIBCO, Inc. ended a two-year dispute and led to a $750,000 set-
tlement, which was at the time the largest penalty ever obtained by 
EPA under RCRA. 
• Mediation commencing in 1997 by an EPA administrative law 
judge was cited as extremely helpful in allowing negotiations to 
continue between the agency and the U.S. Navy over alleged vio-
lations of RCRA at the Washington Navy Yard and Anacostia 
Naval Station in Washington, D.C.23 
Cases 
A large number of EPA enforcement cases where ADR is 
ongoing or has been completed are cases arising under CERCLA. 
CERCLA disputes are often extremely complex affairs involving 
protracted litigation among hundreds of parties that generates con-
siderable transaction costs. It is not unusual for remediation of one 
site to take years to complete and cost tens of millions of dollars. 
The may bring enforcement actions against any or all of the 
parties described in Section 107 of CERCLA, which imposes lia-
bility on four categories of potentially responsible parties (PRPs) 
for the "release" or threatened release from a "facility" (defined 
broadly in the statute) of a "hazardous substance.m4 These parties 
include the past and present owners of the facility, generators (per-
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sons who arranged for the transport, treatment, or disposal of the 
hazardous substance at the site), and transporters (persons 
transported the hazardous substance to the site). Under 
case law, PRPs are strictly severally liable 
response costs incurred that are not inconsistent the National 
Contingency Plan a few 
defenses to liability. EPA and the 
may sue any or the PRPs to ~.-uuwco1 
ate the site or recover amounts "'v'""''"'~"·n 
up the site. 
The EPA 
for cleanup costs. PRPs can and do pursue contribu-
tion actions Section 113 each 
increasing the complexity of cases the incentives for settlement. 
The EPA's case is often problematic, as wastes frequently were 
rl"""'""itPrl years or decades ago at sites, makin2: it to obtain 
records or other evidence to 
requires a tremendous time l:UHmm-
out other cases pending in a federal court. If 
due to ongoing litigation, vlcauu1..1 
the EPA 
for a means to resolve ~DI\.~Ln 
after the 
trum of interest groups commentators endorsed increasing 
of voluntary resolution of CERCLA disputes. 26 One response 
Section 122 ofCERCLA, added in the 1986 amendments. It 
CERCLA Enforcement Mediation 
ized the EPA to enter into agreements "in the public interest ... in 
order to expedite effective remedial actions and minimize litiga-
tion," empowered the EPA to provide certain substantive elements in 
a settlement agreement, and established a framework for initiating 
and conducting settlement negotiations.
27 
Projects 
The EPA's Region V Office of Regional Counsel conducted a 
highly successful pilot CERCLA mediation program in 1991 that 
involved five cases. In four of these cases, mediation resulted in set-
tlement agreements. Participants reported that "constructive work-
ing relationships were developed; obstacles to agreement and the 
reasons therefor were quickly identified; mediators helped prevent 
stalemates; costs of preparing a case for DOJ referral were elimi-
nated; and ongoing relationships were preserved."28 
Throughout the 1990s, the EPA has conducted a series of 
administrative initiatives designed to address complaints and 
its CERCLA enforcement approach. As part of these initia-
tives, the EPA conducted several pilot ADR programs. One such 
effort involved mediation at over 20 Superfund sites and generated 
valuable information about the value of ADR in CERCLA enforce-
ment cases. Other pilot programs have included an Allocations Pilot 
that involved an innovative means of assigning shares of cleanup 
costs to PRPs. The Allocation Pilot Program, developed in 1995, 
tested an allocation process for CERCLA settlements outlined in the 
unsuccessful 1994 legislative proposals designed to overhaul CER-
The pilot process used allocation consultants to determine the 
shares of responsibility of PRPs, including "orphan shares" (the 
shares of defunct or insolvent parties). 
Ce '-...AJL.I..IL'-.U1.1.J. 
The use of mediation in CERCLA has increased dramatically 
m recent years. Since the early 1990s, mediation has become a fre-
quent means of resolving hundreds of CERCLA disputes. In 1997 
alone, for example, the Enforcement Office of EPA's Region 1 used 
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ADR to resolve 16 Superfund cases.29 Mediation is often used at 
Superfund sites for one of two purposes: (1) in cost recovery actions 
and cost allocation; and (2) for reaching agreements on the design 
and implementation of the remedy selected for cleanup of a 
Superfund site. 30 
CERCLA authorizes the EPA to conduct removal actions and 
remedial actions at Superfund sites. The latter, designed to achieve 
complete site remediation at the most severely contaminated sites-
those listed on the National Priorities List (NPL)-take longer to 
complete and are more expensive. The remedial process at NPL sites 
encompasses a number of separate steps, including the remedial 
investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS), record of decision 
(ROD), remedial design/remedial action (RD/RA), construction 
completion, and operation and maintenance. At each of these stages, 
unless the EPA has reached agreement with one or more PRPs, the 
government may need to expend money from the Superfund for 
evaluating the site, deciding on an appropriate cleanup remedy, and 
implementing the remedy. Once the EPA has expended response 
costs, it has a cause of action under CERCLA Section 107 to recov-
er costs not inconsistent with the NCP from the PRPs. 
Recovery of costs expended by the government through cost-
recovery actions brought against PRPs is one of the highest priori-
ties of the Superfund program. The EPA need not wait for the com-
pletion of remedial action before filing a cost-recovery action; activ-
ities related to cost recovery are conducted in each phase of the 
CERCLA remedial process in order to maximize the potential for 
replenishment of the Superfund. The involvement of a mediator in 
a cost-recovery action can help the parties develop a settlement that 
includes a comprehensive framework for cleanup of the site and 
recovery of costs, and the parties' settlement may be embodied in a 
judicial consent decree. 31 
PRPs who are jointly and severally liable for the entire amount 
ofresponse costs under CERCLA use contribution actions (author-
ized under CERCLA Section 113) to shift costs of evaluating and 
remediating a Superfund site to other PRPs. However, CERCLA 
CERCLA Enforcement Mediation 
does not define a means for allocation of response costs, nor does 
the typically relieve the PRPs of their burden to apportion costs 
The EPA has rarely used the process set 
32 which authorizes EPA to 
to PRPs. 
response costs. 
The involvement of a mediator can be indispensable in assist-
ing PRPs to develop a cost allocation formula. the involve-
ment of the neutral third party, cost allocation proceedings can 
become PRPs acting in self-interest to minimize 
cost share through an appropriate One ;rnnArf<>11 
allocation is the "waste-in" 
to the site 
argue for allocation formulas based on 
tors" (proposed by then-Senator Gore in an unsuccessful amend-
ment to CERCLA intended to codify factors for of 
response costs), include such criteria as the relative degree 
contributed to the site and the degree of care exer-
cised by each PRP. The mediator can assist the parties in resolving 
their differences over cost allocation and arriving at a distribution 
of response costs among the In some cases, the EPA has 
used allocators who take a more hands-on approach, assigning 
shares of cleanup costs to the PRPs based on information submitted 
to allocator. 
Mediators have also been involved in resolving disputes 
among parties about the remedial design/remedial action 
stage of the process. The stage, in 
preferred remedy is designed and implemented, 
record of decision memorializes the specific 
chosen for site 33 This RD/RA stage is comparable to the 
design of a construction project. Mediation at this stage is designed 
to resolve issues similar to those encountered in construction proj-
ects: allocating responsibility for performing the work, scheduling 
work, and so forth. 34 
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the use of ADR mandatory in 
any CERCLA enforcement case. The use of ADR is encouraged 
under the statutes and policies described above. Each EPA regional 
office is empowered to decide whether to use ADR in a specific case 
that arises in that The regional office may consider ADR on 
its own m1tlatlve or at request of the PRPs. Once litigation has 
commenced against the PRPs in the Department of 
Justice also becomes in to employ 
Regional ADR specialists in each EPA regional office 
OECA team professionals) advise case teams on the use of 
ADR in regional enforcement actions. The EPA's Fact sug-
gests a number of criteria that influence the ultimate decision to con-
sider entering into ADR. The regional frequently use a con-
vening process to interview the parties and assess suitability of 
the case for ADR. 
Once the case been selected for 
PRPs contract with a u!<:oul,ali.J'l. who brings the 
and 
agency 
other EPA professional as a 
neutral. The EPA's Consensus 
administers two mechanisms 
a trained mediator: a 
the Office of 
Resolution and Consensus tlullelmg l'n::>te:ssJona1s 
the EPA 
Environmental Conflict Resolution. This roster will 
UH1'"CL.n<>rro neutrals. 
CERCLA Enforcement Mediation 
it furnishes dispute resolution professionals 
specific The EPA's regional ADR specialists and the 
ADR professionals also assist in identifying and 
""'"''"'""''";"+"' third-party be that 
the mediator 
ee serves as the 1uc;waLuJ 
services does not arise. In all 
ation 
serve as mediator 
pcouMtc mediators and insists 
with the PRPs. 
enter into 
expenses. If an EPA 
for the mediator's 
entorce1nent medi-
ADR costs be 
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exchanges among parties to ensure to the maximum extent 
possible that any materials exchanged or during the medi-
ation process will not be available to any parties or admissi-
ble in any subsequent judicial or administrative proceeding. 
• The role of the mediator. role of the mediator is an 
part of the mediation agreement. The parties 
decide whether the mediator will play more of a facilitative role 
(helping parties work toward an agreement) or evaluative 
(providing his or her opinions about matters in to 
settlement), or some combination thereof. 
• Participating in, withdrawing from, or ending the 
mediator may to limit the number of those who ,...,,.T,.--,,...~+o 
in the 
The agreement then serves as the basis for the pro-
The mediator conducts meetings the as 
in private sessions between 
of the parties, or as conferences with all 
tives present), encouraging a full and 
of the dispute. The mediator also encourages 
their personal animosity and conflicting 
acceptable settlement. 
Notes 
uses ADR as a core tool in its enforcement strategy, and 
it has been EPA policy since 1987 to use ADR in appropriate cases. 
A substantial number of these cases have been CERCLA enforce-
ment cases. the dominant form of ADR in CERCLA enforce-
ment disputes is mediation, other ADR teclmiques are being used 
creatively. The use of ADR does not indicate weakness in the gov-
ermnent's position or that the EPA has abandoned its important 
mandate to enforce the federal environmental statutes, 
that are advantages in some cases to to ADR. Instead 
of forcing expensive the 
EPA achieve cost agency 
resources for other 
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